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  Using 1980/81 and 1990/91 census data from Australia, Canada, and the United States, we estimate 
the effects of time in the destination country on male immigrants’ wages, employment, and earnings. We 
find that total earnings assimilation is greatest in the United States and least in Australia. Employment 
assimilation explains all of the earnings progress experienced by Australian immigrants, whereas wage 
assimilation plays the dominant role in the United States, and Canada falls in-between. We argue that 
relatively inflexible wages and generous unemployment insurance in countries like Australia may cause 
assimilation to occur along the “quantity” rather than the price dimension. 
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I.  Introduction 
Economists have been studying the economic assimilation of immigrants for over a quarter century 
(Chiswick 1978).  Despite the widespread interest in this question, however, the vast majority of studies 
have focused their attention on a single country, usually the United States.
1 Further, almost all studies 
restrict attention to a single dimension of immigrant assimilation, typically the wages or earnings of those 
immigrants who are employed.  Thus, relatively little is currently known about international differences in 
the amount of immigrant assimilation, or in the form (wages versus employment) this assimilation takes.   
In this paper, we characterize both the amount and form of total earnings assimilation in three 
countries—Australia, Canada, and the United States—using (as far as possible) identical samples and 
procedures for the same period of time.  We find large differences.  Specifically, we find that new 
immigrants face by far the largest wage disadvantage in the United States, but also experience by far the 
greatest rate of wage growth after arrival. Estimated wage assimilation is smaller in Canada and is actually 
negative in Australia, as some immigrant cohorts to that country earn a positive wage premium upon 
arrival, and then assimilate downwards towards the Australian norm.  On the employment dimension, we 
detect assimilation in all three countries, but do not find large differences among countries.  Overall, the 
amount of total earnings assimilation is highest in the United States, and the share of total earnings 
assimilation attributable to wage growth is highest in that country as well, with Australia at the other 
extreme and Canada in-between.   
What might cause these dramatic international differences in the amount and form of immigrant 
assimilation?  After ruling out some obvious possible explanations—for example, differences in observable 
immigrant characteristics and the greater predominance of Latin American immigrants in the United 
                                                 
1 A notable exception is Borjas (1988), who uses earlier data on the same countries as we do.  Unfortunately, because he only had access to a 
single cross-section of data for Australia, he could not separately identify assimilation and cohort effects in that country.  Miller and Neo 
(2001) compare the United States and Australia using a single cross-section in each country.    2   
States—we note that the differences we document are strikingly similar to what one would predict from a 
simple model that emphasizes the effects on assimilation of two institutional features of the host country:  
the degree of wage inequality and the generosity of income floors for the unemployed.  In particular, the 
observed patterns are consistent with a scenario in which Australia’s (and to a lesser extent Canada’s) more 
compressed wage distribution and generous income support (1) force assimilation to occur along the 




II.  Data 
We analyze individual-level data from the 1981 and 1991 Australian and Canadian censuses and the 
1980 and 1990 U.S. census.  For each country, these censuses provide comparable cross-section data at two 
points in time on demographic characteristics and labor force behavior, as well as the requisite information 
on country of birth and year of arrival for foreign-born individuals (henceforth referred to as immigrants).  
Having at least two cross-sections of data for each country is advantageous for estimating immigrant 
assimilation effects, as we explain in the next section, and the large samples of individuals available in 
census data produce relatively precise estimates.  The Australian data constitute one-percent samples of the 
population, the Canadian data are three-percent samples, and the U.S. data are five-percent samples.
3 
The similarities between our three countries that make them, collectively, a good “laboratory” in 
which to study the determinants of immigrant assimilation are well known; they include a high level of 
economic development; a common Anglo-Saxon cultural heritage, language, and legal system; a definition 
of citizenship that is based on country of birth or “naturalization” rather than ethnicity; the feature of being 
                                                 
2 To our knowledge, only two other papers have considered the interaction of national labor market institutions and immigration.  Angrist and 
Kugler (2003) analyze how the impact of immigrants on natives varies with labor market flexibility.  Kahn (2004) reports evidence consistent 
with the hypothesis that greater wage flexibility in the U.S. labor market makes it easier for male immigrants to find jobs, especially when the 
immigrants have low skills.   
3 The U.S. samples are much larger than the samples from the other two countries.  To lighten the computational burden, we employ 0.1-
percent (or one in a 1000) samples of U.S. natives, but we use the full five-percent samples of U.S. immigrants, and we use the full samples of   3   
recently colonized by Europeans with only small aboriginal populations remaining in the country; relatively 
low population densities; a long tradition of immigration; and large immigrant population shares by 
international standards.  As we argue below, these many basic similarities increase the likelihood that the 
large differences in immigrant assimilation patterns identified here are related to current institutional 
differences between the countries. 
We restrict our analysis to men between the ages of 25 and 59 who are not institutional residents.  
We exclude women in order to minimize biases arising from selective labor force participation, and we 
choose this age range so as to focus on men who have completed their formal schooling and who have a 
strong attachment to the labor market.  By comparing outcomes for immigrants with those for natives who 
reside in the same destination country, natives can serve as a control for cross-country differences in social 
or economic conditions or in how the census data were collected.  To increase comparability of the native 
samples across countries and improve their usefulness as a control group, we exclude non-whites from the 
native (but not the immigrant) samples.  In addition, residents of the Atlantic Provinces and the Territories 
are excluded from the Canadian samples, because for these individuals the information about country of 
birth and year of immigration is not reported in sufficient detail.  In the U.S. samples, we exclude 
individuals born in Puerto Rico and other outlying areas of the United States, because the 1980 U.S. census 
does not provide information on year of arrival for such individuals.  Finally, because the inclusion of 
immigrants who arrived as children can bias estimates of assimilation effects, we exclude all foreign-born 
individuals whose age and arrival cohort imply any possibility that they entered the destination country 
prior to age 16. 
 
III.  Empirical Framework 
  As noted, a key goal of this paper is to compare the relative importance of employment versus wage 
                                                                                                                                                                       
natives and immigrants available in the Australian and Canadian data.   4   
adjustments in accounting for the labor market assimilation of immigrants to Australia, Canada, and the 
United States.  To do so, we start with the identity  pw E = , where E denotes the expected earnings of an 
immigrant, p is the probability that the immigrant is employed, and w is the wage paid to the immigrant 
when he is employed.  It is perhaps most natural to think of p as the fraction employed in a cohort of 
immigrants, w as the mean earnings of the employed members of the cohort, and E as the mean earnings of 
all members of the cohort (including those who are not employed and therefore have zero earnings).  In our 
data, E, p, and w are all measured on a weekly basis; i.e., w represents weekly earnings of persons who are 
employed in the census reference week, p represents the probability of being employed during the reference 
week, and E is the average total weekly earnings of a representative member of an immigrant arrival cohort 
including both its employed and nonemployed members.   
  Consider how the cohort’s earnings potential evolves over time as its members adapt to the 
destination country’s labor market.  To a first-order approximation, the above identity implies that 
(1)    w p E D + D = D % % % . 
In percentage terms, the growth in expected earnings arising from immigrant assimilation is equal to the 
sum of assimilation’s impacts on employment rates and wages.  To implement equation (1) empirically, we 
define assimilation as the independent effect of duration of destination-country residence on immigrant 
outcomes.  In other words, for each of our three host countries, we shall ask how immigrant wage and 
employment outcomes change with greater exposure to that country.   
  To  distinguish  assimilation  effects from  cohort  effects,  we  adopt  the  regression  framework 
developed by Borjas (1985, 1995).  Specifically, let  y j
g  represent the outcome for individual j, where the 
superscript g takes on the values I for immigrants and N for natives.  Pooling data from the 1981 and 1991 
censuses,
4 immigrant outcomes are determined by the equation 
                                                 
4 These are the years relevant for the Australian and Canadian census data.  For the U.S. census data, the corresponding years are 1980 and 
1990.   5   
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where the vector C is a set of mutually exclusive dummy variables identifying immigrant arrival cohorts, 
the vector A is a set of mutually exclusive dummy variables indicating how long an immigrant has lived in 
the destination country, T is a dummy variable marking observations from the 1991 census, the vector X 
contains other determinants of outcomes, e  is a random error term, and the remaining parameters are the 
objects of estimation.  This specification gives each immigrant arrival cohort its own intercept, and 
differences in these intercepts represent permanent outcome differentials between cohorts.  The coefficients 
of the duration of destination-country residence dummies measure the effects of immigrant assimilation on 
the outcome variable.  In addition, the coefficients of the variables in X are allowed to vary across census 
years, with the subscripts 81 and 91 indicating the survey year of a particular parameter vector. 
  The corresponding equation for natives is 
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where a
N  is the intercept for natives, and the arrival cohort and duration of destination-country residence 
variables are excluded from this equation because they are not relevant for natives. 
  An analysis of immigrant outcomes must confront the classic problem of distinguishing cohort, age, 
and period effects.  The main identifying restriction imposed in equations (2) and (3) is that the period 
effect p  is the same for immigrants and natives, as indicated by the absence of a superscript on this 
parameter.  In essence, the period effect is estimated from natives, and this information is used to identify 
cohort and assimilation effects for immigrants.  A key assumption of this approach is that compositional 
changes in the subsample of an immigrant cohort observed—such as those caused by emigration, mortality, 
and labor force entry and exit—do not bias measured outcome changes.  To estimate the parameters of 
equations (2) and (3), we pool observations on immigrants and natives from both years of census data into 
a single regression, and then impose the restrictions implicit in these equations by introducing the   6   
appropriate interaction terms between nativity, the 1990/91 census dummy, and the other explanatory 
variables. 
  Equation (2) also imposes the restriction that the rate of immigrant assimilation does not vary 
across arrival cohorts.  This restriction conveniently synthesizes the experiences of various arrival cohorts 
over the 1980s into a single assimilation profile for each outcome and country, but we obtain similar results 
from  less  restrictive  specifications  that  allow  for  cohort-specific  assimilation  profiles.    For  U.S. 
immigrants, Duleep and Regets (1999) and Borjas (2000) present evidence on how assimilation patterns 
differ by arrival cohort. 
 
IV.  Estimation Results 
  In this section, we use the empirical approach just described to estimate the impact of assimilation 
on the employment and wage opportunities of immigrants to Australia, Canada, and the United States.  
Interpreting these estimates in the context of equation (1), we then compare the relative importance of 
employment versus wage adjustments in accounting for immigrant labor market assimilation in these three 
countries.   
a. Employment Assimilation 
  Table 1 presents selected coefficients from estimating equations (2) and (3) for employment.  The 
dependent variable is a dummy identifying whether the individual was employed during the census survey 
week.   The  coefficients  were  estimated by least squares, and robust standard errors are shown in 
parentheses.  In addition to the variables listed in Table 1, all regressions include controls for age and 
geographic location.
5  Two specifications are reported for each destination country.  The first specification, 
in the columns labeled (1), includes the independent variables mentioned so far, whereas the second 
                                                 
5 The age variables are dummies identifying five-year age groups from 30-34 through 55-59, with 25-29 year-olds as the omitted reference 
group.  The geographic variables indicate region of residence within each destination country (with eight regions defined for Australia, six 
regions for Canada, and nine regions for the United States) and whether the individual lives in a metropolitan area.  The coefficients of the   7   
specification, in the columns labeled (2), also controls for years of schooling.  Immigrants, even those who 
migrate  as  adults,  frequently  acquire  additional  education  after  arriving  in  the  destination  country 
(Chiswick and Miller1992; Betts and Lofstrom 2000).  For this reason, we focus our discussion on results 
from the specification that does not control for education, because this specification allows for a broader 
notion of labor market assimilation that includes the effects of post-migration investments in schooling.  In 
general, however, the two specifications yield similar results. 
  Table 1 reports the immigrant cohort and assimilation effects, as well as the period effects, from the 
employment regressions.
6  The estimated period effects, which are the coefficients on the 1990/91 census 
dummy, indicate that employment opportunities deteriorated between 1981 and 1991 in Australia and 
Canada and did not change much in the United States over the same decade.  The immigrant arrival cohort 
coefficients  reported  in  Table  1  have  been  normalized  to  represent  immigrant-native  employment 
differentials for men who are aged 25-29 (in both specifications) and who have 12 years of education in 
1990/91 (in specification (2)).  In addition, these differentials pertain to immigrants from the relevant 
arrival cohort when they have lived in the destination country for five years or less.  For example, the 
estimated coefficient for 1976-80 Australian immigrants in column (1) indicates that, in their first five 
years after arriving, this cohort had an employment rate 14.5 percentage points below that of otherwise 
similar natives. 
  That the cohort coefficients are uniformly negative implies that, in all three countries, immigrants 
from every arrival period initially experienced lower employment than natives, but these employment 
deficits for new immigrants are much larger in Australia and the United States than in Canada.  Within 
each country, the coefficients tend to be similar in magnitude for the various arrival cohorts.  This finding 
                                                                                                                                                                       
geographic controls are restricted to be the same for immigrants and natives, but these coefficients can differ across survey years.  The 
coefficients of the age and education variables are allowed to vary both by nativity and survey year. 
6 The intervals listed for immigrant arrival cohorts are those defined in the Australian and Canadian data; the slightly different immigrant 
cohorts defined in the U.S. data are as follows:  pre-1960, 1960-64, 1965-69, 1970-74, 1975-79, 1980-84, and 1985-90.  The 1991 Australian 
census does not distinguish 1960s arrivals from earlier immigrants, and therefore “pre-1971” is the most precise arrival cohort that can be 
defined consistently across censuses for Australian immigrants.  For Canada and the United States, however, immigrants arriving during these   8   
suggests that, after controlling for years spent in the destination country, employment rates do not differ 
much across cohorts.  The one important exception is the 1986-91 cohort of Canadian immigrants, whose 
employment rate is estimated to be permanently below that of other Canadian arrival cohorts by at least 6 
percentage points. 
  We now turn to the assimilation effects that are the focus of our analysis.  In Table 1, the 
coefficients of the “time in destination country” dummy variables indicate how employment rates change 
as an immigrant cohort becomes more familiar with its new surroundings.  Australian and American 
immigrants display virtually identical patterns in which the bulk of employment assimilation takes place 
within the first decade after arrival.
7  In both Australia and the United States, employment rates shoot up by 
10 percentage points as immigrants pass from 0-5 to 6-10 years in the destination country, but thereafter 
employment increases only modestly (2-4 percentage points) with further exposure to the host labor 
market. 
  Employment assimilation for Canadian immigrants, by contrast, is a much more continuous process 
that takes longer to play out.  For example, according to the estimates that do not control for education 
(specification (1)), immigrant employment rates rise (relative to their level during the initial five years of 
Canadian residence) by 4 percentage points after 6-10 years, 6 percentage points after 11-15 years, 8 
percentage points after 16-20 years, and 10 percentage points after more than 20 years in Canada.  Despite 
the fact that employment assimilation beyond the first decade of residence is strongest for Canadian 
immigrants, the much greater initial adjustments of Australian and American immigrants result in total 
employment growth, even after more than 20 years of assimilation, that is larger in Australia and the 
United States (12-14 percentage points) than in Canada (9-10 percentage points). 
  Finally, recall the negative cohort coefficients discussed earlier.  These coefficients indicate that, 
                                                                                                                                                                       
years are disaggregated into “1966-70,” “1961-65,” and “pre-1961” cohorts.  
7 For the United States, several earlier studies find this same pattern of immigrant employment adjustment. See for example Chiswick, Cohen, 
and Zach (1997) and Funkhouser (2000).  For Australia, McDonald and Worswick (1999b) report a similar finding for unemployment:  the   9   
upon arrival, all immigrant cohorts had employment rates lower than those of comparable natives.  
Employment growth from assimilation, however, eventually erases all or most of this initial employment 
deficit for every immigrant arrival cohort.  Consider, for example, the 1971-75 cohort of U.S. immigrants.  
According to the specification (1) estimates that do not control for education, during its first five years in 
the United States this cohort had an employment rate 14 percentage points below that of natives.  After just 
6-10 years of U.S. residence, however, assimilation narrows the employment gap of this cohort by 10 
percentage points, and after 20 years in the United States the cohort’s employment rate closes to within a 
percentage point of the rate for comparable natives.  Immigrants from other arrival cohorts and in other 
host countries display the same basic pattern.  With sufficient time for adjustment, male immigrants in 
these three countries attain employment rates similar to those of natives. 
b. Wage Assimilation 
  Table 2 presents analogous estimates for the natural logarithm of wages, our other outcome 
variable.  These log wage regressions are identical in structure to the employment regressions in Table 1, 
except that now the sample is restricted to employed men, and controls have been added for hours worked 
during the census survey week.  These controls for weekly hours of work are included so that our estimates 
using the available information on weekly income (for Australia) or earnings (for Canada and the United 
States) more closely approximate the effects on hourly wages (i.e., the “price” of labor) that we seek.  The 
coefficients of the weekly hours indicators are allowed to vary across census years but not by nativity.  
Because the dependent variables in Table 2 represent nominal wages, the estimated period effects (i.e., the 
coefficients on the 1990/91 census dummy) reflect whatever inflation occurred during the 1980s, as well as 
the effects on real wages of any changes in national economic conditions that took place over the decade. 
  In Table 2, the estimated coefficients of the arrival cohort dummies reveal the extent of permanent 
wage differences between immigrant cohorts.  Such wage differences are relatively modest in Australia and 
                                                                                                                                                                       
unemployment rates of immigrant men decline sharply, both in absolute terms and relative to native unemployment rates, during the first   10   
somewhat larger in Canada and the United States.  Wage profiles tend to be lower for more recent arrival 
cohorts, especially in Canada and the United States.  For example, in the specification (1) regression that 
does  not  control for  education,  Canadian  immigrants  arriving  in  1986-91  have  a permanent wage 
disadvantage  of  about  30  percent  relative  to  their  predecessors  who  arrived  before  1970.    The 
corresponding wage deficit is smaller but still sizeable for the most recent cohort of U.S. immigrants.  The 
pattern in Table 2 of a steady decline in wages for successive cohorts of male immigrants to Canada and 
the United States confirms the findings of previous studies (e.g., Baker and Benjamin (1994) and Bloom, 
Grenier, and Gunderson (1995) for Canada, and Borjas (1985, 1995) and Funkhouser and Trejo (1998) for 
the United States). 
  The estimated coefficients of the “time in destination country” dummy variables measure wage 
growth due to immigrant assimilation.  Consistent with earlier research by Borjas (1988) and McDonald 
and Worswick (1999a), we find no evidence of positive wage assimilation for Australian immigrants.  
Although both Canadian and U.S. immigrants enjoy significant wage boosts arising from increased 
exposure to the destination country’s labor market, the magnitude and duration of such wage assimilation is 
greater in the United States. For example, without controlling for education, the estimates imply that wages 
grow by 11 percent as an immigrant cohort in Canada extends its time in the country from 0-5 to 11-15 
years, but additional exposure to Canada beyond this point produces little wage improvement.  For U.S. 
immigrants, the corresponding wage growth is 14 percent after 11-15 years in the country and 24 percent 
after 20-plus years of residence.  Estimates of immigrant wage assimilation and the pattern of differences 
across destination countries are similar in specification (2), which controls for education. 
c. Total Earnings Assimilation and its Components 
  Given the estimates, from Tables 1 and 2, of how immigrant employment and wage opportunities 
evolve with greater exposure to the host country, we can now implement equation (1).  As discussed 
                                                                                                                                                                       
decade after arrival.   11   
earlier, equation (1) decomposes the labor market assimilation of immigrants into employment and wage 
components, where each component is simply the percentage impact of assimilation on the relevant 
outcome.  The log specification of the dependent variable in the wage regressions implies that the 
assimilation  coefficients  from  these  regressions  already  approximate  percentage  effects,  but  the 
corresponding coefficients in the employment regressions do not.  We transform the estimated employment 
effects of assimilation into percentage terms by comparing these effects with the employment rates of the 
most recent arrival cohort in the 1990/91 data. 
  For each destination country, Table 3 reports the resulting estimates of the components of equation 
(1), with standard errors in parentheses.  The top panel of Table 3 presents estimates based on the 
regressions that do not control for education, whereas the bottom panel shows results from the alternative 
specification that conditions on education. As prescribed by equation (1), “total” immigrant earnings 
growth due to assimilation is computed as the sum of the estimates of earnings growth from employment 
assimilation and from wage assimilation.  These calculations are reported for the assimilation-induced 
growth that occurs for an immigrant cohort between its first five years in the destination country and each 
of the durations of residence ranging from “6-10 years” to “more than 20 years.”  Finally, in order to 
highlight differences across countries in the nature of immigrant labor market adjustment, Table 3 also 
shows the percentage of total earnings growth from assimilation that arises from employment assimilation 
rather than from wage assimilation. 
  Initially consider the estimates in the top panel of Table 3, which do not control for education.  
Employment assimilation is an important contributor to immigrant earnings growth in all three countries, 
but the timing of this contribution varies.  In Australia and the United States, the vast majority of 
immigrant employment assimilation occurs during the first decade after arrival, whereas employment rates 
for Canadian immigrants rise more continuously with duration of residence.  In addition, the ultimate 
impact of employment assimilation is somewhat less in Canada than in the other two countries.  After more   12   
than two decades in the destination country, employment assimilation increases immigrant earnings by 
about 17 percent in Australia and the United States and by 13 percent in Canada.  Earnings growth from 
wage assimilation, on the other hand, is largest in the United States, sizeable in Canada, and zero or 
negative in Australia.  Summing together the effects of employment and wage assimilation, earnings grow 
with duration of residence the most for U.S. immigrants and the least for Australian immigrants.  After 
more than 20 years in the destination country, for example, total earnings growth from immigrant 
assimilation is 40 percent in the United States, 25 percent in Canada, and 8 percent in Australia. 
  Finally, Table 3 quantifies the relative contributions of wage and employment assimilation to total 
immigrant earnings assimilation in these three countries using the simple decomposition in equation (1). 
The top panel of Table 3 shows that, at almost any duration of residence, the earnings growth of Canadian 
immigrants derives in roughly equal parts from employment assimilation and from wage assimilation.  For 
Canadian immigrants, employment and wages rise at about the same rate with greater exposure to their 
adopted country.  For U.S. immigrants, however, wage assimilation proceeds continuously but employment 
gains are concentrated in the first decade after arrival.  As a result, for the United States, the share of 
immigrant earnings growth attributable to employment assimilation falls from 71 percent after 6-10 years 
of residence to 41 percent after more than 20 years of residence.  For the first 15 years after arrival, 
employment adjustments account for a larger share of immigrant earnings growth in the United States than 
in Canada, but the opposite pattern emerges at longer durations of residence. 
  The bottom panel of Table 3 reports analogous estimates that control for education.  Overall, the 
patterns are very similar to the top panel.  For Canada and the United States, controlling for education 
generates somewhat lower estimates of employment assimilation and the share of total earnings growth 
arising from employment assimilation, but the comparisons across countries remain as described above.  
We note, however, that only for the United States is the share of earnings growth due to employment 
assimilation estimated with much precision, so although cross-country differences in our estimates of this   13   
share are suggestive, they are not statistically significant. 
 
V. Possible Explanations 
 
One  obvious  factor  that  might  explain  the  dramatic  differences  in  immigrant  assimilation 
documented above is the marked difference in the source country composition of immigrant flows to 
Australia, Canada and the United States (Reitz 1998; Antecol, Cobb-Clark, and Trejo 2003).  In particular, 
Borjas (1993) and Antecol, Cobb-Clark, and Trejo (2003) show that the skill deficit for U.S. immigrants 
relative to Australian and Canadian immigrants arises primarily because the United States receives a much 
larger share of immigrants from Latin America than do the other two countries.  Consequently, an 
important concern is whether broad differences in region of origin drive the cross-country patterns of 
immigrant assimilation that we observe. 
  To  investigate  this  issue,  we  replicated  our  analyses  for  two  subsamples  of  the  immigrant 
population that are fairly homogeneous in national origins yet still provide sufficiently large sample sizes 
for each country: only men born in Europe and only men born in Asia.  The patterns for European and 
Asian immigrants considered separately are similar to those for all source countries combined (we do not 
report these results here, but they are available upon request).  Thus it does not appear that broad 
differences in region of origin, and in particular the large role of Latin American immigrants in the United 
States, explain our results. 
  Could host-country differences in immigration policy (including perhaps their effects on the more 
detailed national origin mix of immigrants) explain why immigrant assimilation patterns are so different 
across these three countries?  On the surface, this might be an appealing explanation of at least the 
differences in wage assimilation:  could it be that, because of Australian immigration policy, Australian 
immigrants are so well “matched” to the Australian labor market that they earn as much as (or more than) 
Australian natives on arrival, making further progress relative to natives impossible? Since a larger fraction   14   
of Australian (and Canadian) immigrants are selected on the basis of labor market qualifications, this is a 
potentially appealing hypothesis.  However, as Borjas (1993) and Antecol, Cobb-Clark and Trejo (2003) 
have shown, once the large share of U.S. immigrants from Latin America is controlled for, the Australian 
and Canadian points systems have little demonstrable impact on the qualifications of immigrants.  Since 
our main results continue to hold very strongly for subsets of immigrants from Europe or Asia, these 
“points systems” are thus unlikely to account for all the international differences in assimilation patterns 
documented here.  Further, a more labor-market-oriented immigration policy should raise immigrants’ 
relative employment rates on arrival, and this is clearly not the case in Australia or Canada relative to the 
United States.
8  
  Another possible explanation of differences in immigrant assimilation patterns is international 
differences in host-country labor market institutions other than immigration policy.  Such differences, 
including unionization and income support policies, have recently been linked to international differences 
in wage inequality (DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux 1996; Blau and Kahn 1996), in the manner in which 
economies respond to adverse shocks to the demand for unskilled labor (Card, Kramarz, and Lemieux 
1999; McDonald and Worswick 2000), in the size of the gender wage gap (Blau and Kahn 2000), in the 
magnitude of wage losses experienced by displaced workers (Kuhn 2002), in youth unemployment (Abowd 
et al. 2000), in work hours (Bell and Freeman 2001), in technical progress (Moene and Wallerstein 1997), 
and in the amount of labor reallocation across industries (Bertola and Rogerson 1997). 
Given this extensive literature, it seems natural to ask whether a nation’s labor market institutions 
might also shape the way in which new immigrants integrate into its economy.  For example, any national 
policy or institution that effectively imposes a binding wage floor, or any policy that provides income 
                                                 
8 Another possible source of bias in our results stems from the fact that universities in Australia, Canada, and the United States host a sizeable 
number of foreign undergraduate and graduate students who typically return to their home countries after completing their studies.  Return 
migration by these foreign students could cause immigrant employment rates to rise sharply after an arrival cohort has spent 5-10 years in the 
destination country.  More generally, the presence of temporary immigrants such as foreign students in our samples can bias estimates of 
assimilation profiles, and the nature of this bias might vary across destination countries.  To explore this issue, we redid our analyses after 
dropping from the samples anyone currently enrolled in school.  Very little change was observed.   15   
support for unemployed immigrants, might “force” immigrant assimilation to occur along the employment 
rather than the wage dimension (e.g., Harris and Todaro 1970).  Any institution that compresses a country’s 
wage distribution would operate in two distinct ways. The first of these is purely mechanical:  suppose that, 
over the course of his first ten years in the country, an immigrant to any country advances five percentiles 
in the native wage distribution.  Simply because the rungs of the wage “ladder” are farther apart in high-
inequality countries, immigrants to those countries will experience greater wage growth (relative to 
natives) than immigrants to other countries.
9  The second effect is behavioral: suppose that the investment 
required to rise one rung on the wage ladder (e.g., learning English) is equally costly in these three 
countries.  Then immigrants to compressed-wage countries will be less inclined to make such investments. 
Do the actual institutional differences across the three countries studied in this paper accord with 
the differences required by the above discussion?  Concerning the wage-setting process, Table 4 shows the 
well-known difference in union density between the United States and Canada, as well as the well-known 
decline in U.S. union density between 1980 and 1990.  While union density in both countries is low by 
OECD standards, by the end of our sample period union density in Canada was more than double that in 
the United States (36 versus 16 percent).  In both countries, coverage is only marginally greater than 
density, and wage bargaining is extremely decentralized (among 19 OECD countries, only one country 
ranks lower than Canada and the United States in terms of bargaining centralization).  Australia’s union 
membership rates are higher than both Canada’s and the United States’s, but the most dramatic difference 
is in union coverage:  in both our sample years, 80 percent or more of Australian workers’ wages were 
determined by collective bargaining agreements.  Further, this wage-setting process is highly centralized 
and coordinated.  In 1990, Australia was ranked first (tied with Austria, Belgium, Finland, Norway, 
Portugal, and Sweden) among 19 countries in bargaining centralization by the OECD.
10 
                                                 
9 For the United States, this “mechanical” effect of wage structure on the immigrant-native wage gap has been explored by Butcher and 
DiNardo (2002) and Lubotsky (2001). 
10 During our sample period, the dominant institution in Australian wage-setting was the “awards” system, a system whereby unions,   16   
The consequences of these different wage-setting institutions for wage dispersion can be seen in 
panel B of Table 4.  As Blau and Kahn (1996) have argued, high levels of union coverage tend to be 
associated with low levels of wage dispersion, and this is certainly borne out in our data.  By all 
measures—the 90/10 ratio (ratio of the 90
th to the 10
th percentiles of the weekly earnings distribution), 
90/50 ratio, 50/10 ratio, or the standard deviation of log wages—Australia had the most compressed wage 
distribution in both years of our data, and the United States the most dispersed.  Canada stands between 
these two extremes on most measures, though it is tied with the United States on two of these measures in 
1990, perhaps reflecting a more severe recession at that time.  All three countries exhibit increasing wage 
inequality between 1980 and 1990. 
Concerning the income support available to unemployed workers, an aggregate, comparable index 
of benefit generosity computed by the OECD in Table 4 shows similar overall replacement rates in Canada 
and Australia, and a much lower rate in the United States.  While this probably summarizes overall 
generosity reasonably well, there are a number of reasons to suspect that these figures understate the 
differences among the three countries, especially as it affects immigrants.  One such difference is the take-
up rate of unemployment insurance (UI) benefits:  in 1990, the ratio of UI beneficiaries to the total number 
of unemployed was 34 percent in the United States, 82 percent in Australia, and 87 percent in Canada.
11  
Thus it is much less likely that an unemployed worker in the United States will actually receive UI benefits 
than in Australia or Canada.  Second, the Australian income support system has three features that make it 
especially generous for immigrants:  unlike the United States and Canadian systems, eligibility does not 
require prior employment, recent immigrants are not explicitly disqualified from receiving benefits, and 
                                                                                                                                                                       
employers, and government representatives met at the national level to negotiate wage rates specific to hundreds of occupations.  Although 
firms were free to pay above-award wages, this was rare in practice.  Thus, for all intents and purposes, Australian wages during our sample 
period were centrally administered at the occupation level.  Statutory minimum wages were set at similar (low) fractions of the average wage 
in Canada and the United States, and they did not exist in Australia because they were superseded by the awards system. 
11OECD, 1994, Table 8.4, plus CANSIM Series v384773 [the OECD’s table includes UI and welfare cases for Canada; thus we retrieved our 
own beneficiary counts from Statistics Canada’s CANSIM database].  Australian figures refer to 1991. For Canada, our figures include regular 
UI beneficiaries only (thus they exclude UI benefits for job training, maternity, sickness, etc.).  As noted, Australia has only a means-tested 
program—these figures refer to it.  U.S. figures, like those for Canada, include UI claimants only (thus excluding welfare). In all cases the 
count of beneficiaries refers to an annual average stock (not to the total number of persons receiving benefit at any time during the year).   17   
benefits do not depend on previous wages.  Furthermore, in Australia these benefits are payable for an 
indefinite period, in contrast to maximum entitlement periods of a year in Canada and 26 weeks in the 
United States.  Overall, it thus appears that Australia’s income support system is the most generous to 
immigrants, and both Canada and Australia are clearly more generous than the United States.   
  In  sum,  the  institutional  differences  summarized  above  are  consistent  with  the  patterns  of 
immigrant assimilation documented in this paper.  The broad institutional features of these labor markets 
lead us to expect wages to be the primary mode of assimilation in the United States, employment in 
Australia, with Canada in between.  Empirically we find that employment gains explain all of the labor 
market progress experienced by Australian immigrants, that the magnitude of wage assimilation is greatest 
in the United States, and that (for sufficiently long periods of adjustment) the share of immigrant earnings 
growth due to wage assimilation rather than employment assimilation is also largest in the United States. 
  A final concern with the “institutional” hypothesis described above is the notion that institutional 
differences among these three countries cause systematically different types of immigrants to be attracted 
to each country.  For example, individuals with high learning capacities should be disproportionately 
attracted to the U.S. market, where investments in additional human capital are more likely to be rewarded. 
 We do not dispute this possibility; in fact we think it is quite likely.  Instead we simply note, first, that any 
self-selection of this nature that is induced by international institutional differences would simply reinforce 
the international differences in assimilation patterns that we observe.  Second, self-selection on “ambition” 
or “learning ability” that is induced by international institutional differences can be seen as a logical 
extension of Borjas’s (1987) argument that international differences in wage inequality should affect the 
average ability level of immigrants.  Indeed, it is exactly what we should expect if host country labor 
market institutions really matter. 
 
VI.  Conclusion   18   
  In this paper we generate estimates of employment and wage assimilation among immigrants to 
Australia, Canada, and the United States using census data spanning the decade of the 1980s.  We find that 
total earnings assimilation is greatest in the United States and least in Australia.  Further, employment 
assimilation explains all of the earnings progress experienced by Australian immigrants, whereas wage 
assimilation plays the dominant role in the United States, and Canada falls in-between. 
  We argue that these patterns are suggestive of an effect of host country labor market institutions on 
the immigrant assimilation process, with relatively inflexible wages and generous unemployment insurance 
in countries like Australia causing assimilation to occur along the “quantity” rather than the price 
dimension.  Also, Australia’s relatively compressed wage distribution reduces the scope for immigrant 
wage growth and might reduce incentives to make post-arrival investments in human capital.   
Of  course,  it  is  certainly  possible  that  the  dramatic  international  differences  in  immigrant 
assimilation documented here derive from idiosyncrasies of these countries other than the labor market 
institutions that we emphasize.  After all, with only three countries, we have very few degrees of freedom 
for discriminating among alternative hypotheses.  Nonetheless, our results strongly suggest that greater 
attention to the role of national labor market institutions—in particular those that influence the dispersion 
of wages and the incomes of the unemployed—may help to advance our understanding of why the 
immigrant assimilation process appears to operate so differently across destination countries.   19   
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Table 1 
Employment Regressions 
Assimilation, Cohort and Period Effects 
 
    Australia    Canada    United States 
Regressor    (1)    (2)    (1)    (2)    (1)    (2) 
                         
Time in Destination Country:                         
   6-10 Years    .101    .099    .039    .031    .099    .100 
    (.029)    (.029)    (.016)    (.016)    (.006)    (.006) 
   11-15 Years    .112    .120    .060    .055    .113    .110 
    (.023)    (.025)    (.012)    (.013)    (.005)    (.005) 
   16-20 Years    .121    .130    .083    .070    .115    .113 
    (.027)    (.029)    (.017)    (.019)    (.007)    (.008) 
   More than 20 Years    .126    .140    .096    .086    .130    .122 
    (.031)    (.033)    (.019)    (.021)    (.009)    (.010) 
Immigrant Arrival Cohort:                         
   Pre-1961            -.069    -.023    -.160    -.118 
            (.021)    (.027)    (.010)    (.013) 
   1961-65            -.060    -.014    -.141    -.103 
            (.019)    (.024)    (.009)    (.011) 
   1966-70            -.044    -.011    -.147    -.107 
            (.016)    (.021)    (.007)    (.010) 
   Pre-1971    -.150    -.168                 
    (.029)    (.038)                 
   1971-75    -.147    -.161    -.054    -.017    -.141    -.101 
    (.030)    (.036)    (.017)    (.020)    (.007)    (.009) 
   1976-80    -.145    -.164    -.054    -.026    -.140    -.103 
    (.018)    (.026)    (.009)    (.012)    (.004)    (.006) 
   1981-85    -.167    -.172    -.065    -.037    -.146    -.113 
    (.033)    (.035)    (.018)    (.019)    (.007)    (.008) 
   1986-91    -.125    -.140    -.130    -.110    -.124    -.094 
    (.017)    (.018)    (.008)    (.009)    (.004)    (.004) 
                         
1990/91 Census Dummy    -.086    -.188    -.053    -.128    .008    -.017 
    (.010)    (.019)    (.004)    (.007)    (.006)    (.007) 
                         
R
2    .033    .045    .033    .059    .024    .034 
                         
Controls for Education    No    Yes    No    Yes    No    Yes 
 
Note:  The dependent variable is a dummy identifying whether the individual was employed during the census survey week.  The coefficients 
were estimated by least squares, and robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.  Data are from the 1981 and 1991 Australian and 
Canadian censuses and the 1980 and 1990 U.S. censuses.  The samples include men ages 25-59, with non-whites excluded from the native but 
not the foreign-born samples.  The sample sizes for these regressions are 52,664 for Australia, 259,777 for Canada, and 432,179 for the United 
States.  In addition to the variables listed above, all regressions include indicators for age and geographic location.  The coefficients of the 
geographic controls are restricted to be the same for immigrants and natives, but these coefficients can differ across census years.  The 
coefficients of the age and education variables are allowed to vary both by nativity and census year.  The reference group for the “time in 
destination country” dummies is 0-5 years.  The intervals listed above for the immigrant arrival cohorts are those defined in the Australian and 
Canadian data; the slightly different immigrant cohorts defined in the U.S. data are as follows:  pre-1960, 1960-64, 1965-69, 1970-74, 1975-
79, 1980-84, and 1985-90.  The immigrant cohort coefficients reported in this table have been normalized to represent immigrant-native 
employment differentials for men who are aged 25-29 (in both specifications) and who have 12 years of education in 1990/91 (in specification 
(2)).   23   
Table 2 
Wage Regressions 
Assimilation, Cohort and Period Effects 
 
    Australia    Canada    United States 
Regressor    (1)    (2)    (1)    (2)    (1)    (2) 
                         
Time in Destination Country:                         
   6-10 Years    .032    .009    .046    .052    .052    .070 
    (.047)    (.046)    (.043)    (.042)    (.017)    (.015) 
   11-15 Years    -.063    -.086    .111    .139    .144    .183 
    (.037)    (.039)    (.028)    (.031)    (.011)    (.012) 
   16-20 Years    -.061    -.087    .094    .115    .158    .203 
    (.044)    (.046)    (.045)    (.047)    (.018)    (.018) 
   More than 20 Years    -.090    -.120    .123    .160    .236    .271 
    (.049)    (.053)    (.046)    (.051)    (.020)    (.022) 
Immigrant Arrival Cohort:                         
   Pre-1961            -.083    -.019    -.102    -.056 
            (.052)    (.064)    (.023)    (.028) 
   1961-65            -.109    -.042    -.135    -.082 
            (.047)    (.057)    (.020)    (.024) 
   1966-70            -.102    -.087    -.224    -.146 
            (.038)    (.049)    (.017)    (.022) 
   Pre-1971    -.009    .065                 
    (.046)    (.060)                 
   1971-75    -.058    .004    -.174    -.139    -.253    -.142 
    (.048)    (.057)    (.045)    (.049)    (.018)    (.020) 
   1976-80    -.040    -.009    -.222    -.196    -.300    -.206 
    (.025)    (.038)    (.021)    (.029)    (.009)    (.013) 
   1981-85    -.137    -.100    -.239    -.206    -.338    -.230 
    (.053)    (.053)    (.048)    (.048)    (.018)    (.017) 
   1986-91    -.077    -.098    -.393    -.354    -.373    -.271 
    (.023)    (.024)    (.021)    (.021)    (.008)    (.009) 
                         
1990/91 Census Dummy    .705    .560    .510    .337    .435    .354 
    (.016)    (.031)    (.009)    (.018)    (.013)    (.016) 
                         
R
2    .334    .369    .148    .189    .184    .288 
                         
Controls for Education    No    Yes    No    Yes    No    Yes 
 
Note:  The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of weekly personal income (for Australia) or weekly earnings (for Canada and the 
United States).  The coefficients were estimated by least squares, and robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.  Data are from the 1981 
and 1991 Australian and Canadian censuses and the 1980 and 1990 U.S. censuses.  The samples include employed men ages 25-59, with non-
whites excluded from the native but not the foreign-born samples.  The sample sizes for these regressions are 43,590 for Australia, 217,773 for 
Canada, and 359,999 for the United States.  In addition to the variables listed above, all regressions include indicators for age, geographic 
location, and hours worked during the census survey week.  The coefficients of the controls for geographic location and weekly hours of work 
are restricted to be the same for immigrants and natives, but these coefficients can differ across census years.  The coefficients of the age and 
education variables are allowed to vary both by nativity and census year.  The reference group for the “time in destination country” dummies is 
0-5 years.  The intervals listed above for the immigrant arrival cohorts are those defined in the Australian and Canadian data; the slightly 
different immigrant cohorts defined in the U.S. data are as follows:  pre-1960, 1960-64, 1965-69, 1970-74, 1975-79, 1980-84, and 1985-90.  
The immigrant cohort coefficients reported in this table have been normalized to represent immigrant-native wage differentials for men who 
are  aged  25-29  (in  both  specifications)  and  who  have  12  years  of  education  in  1990/91  (in  specification  (2)).  24   
Table 3 
Components of Immigrant Earnings Growth from Assimilation 
 
    Australia    Canada    United States 
     
Percentage Earnings Growth 
from Assimilation in: 
  Percent 
of Total 
Due to 
   
Percentage Earnings Growth 
from Assimilation in: 
  Percent 
of Total 
Due to 
   
Percentage Earnings Growth 
from Assimilation in: 
  Percent 
of Total 
Due to 
    Emp    Wage    Total    Emp    Emp    Wage    Total    Emp    Emp    Wage    Total    Emp 
A.  Without Education Controls                                                 
                                                 
Time in Destination Country:                                                 
   6-10 Years    13.5    3.2    16.7    80.9    5.3    4.6    9.9    53.7    12.5    5.2    17.7    70.7 
    (3.9)    (4.7)    (6.1)    (23.2)    (2.2)    (4.3)    (4.8)    (25.4)    (0.8)    (1.7)    (1.9)    (6.9) 
                                                 
   11-15 Years    15.0    -6.3    8.7    >100    8.2    11.1    19.3    42.5    14.3    14.4    28.7    49.9 
    (3.1)    (3.7)    (4.8)        (1.6)    (2.8)    (3.2)    (7.9)    (0.6)    (1.1)    (1.3)    (2.2) 
                                                 
   16-20 Years    16.2    -6.1    10.1    >100    11.3    9.4    20.7    54.7    14.6    15.8    30.4    48.0 
    (3.6)    (4.4)    (5.7)        (2.3)    (4.5)    (5.1)    (12.9)    (0.9)    (1.8)    (2.0)    (3.2) 
                                                 
   More than 20 Years    16.9    -9.0    7.9    >100    13.1    12.3    25.4    51.6    16.5    23.6    40.1    41.1 
    (4.1)    (4.9)    (6.4)        (2.6)    (4.6)    (5.3)    (10.6)    (1.1)    (2.0)    (2.3)    (2.6) 
                                                 
B.  With Education Controls                                                 
                                                 
Time in Destination Country:                                                 
   6-10 Years    13.3    0.9    14.2    93.6    4.2    5.2    9.4    44.9    12.7    7.0    19.7    64.4 
    (3.9)    (4.6)    (6.0)    (30.5)    (2.2)    (4.2)    (4.7)    (23.7)    (0.8)    (1.5)    (1.7)    (5.1) 
                                                 
   11-15 Years    16.1    -8.6    7.5    >100    7.5    13.9    21.4    35.1    13.9    18.3    32.2    43.2 
    (3.3)    (3.9)    (5.1)        (1.8)    (3.1)    (3.6)    (7.4)    (0.6)    (1.2)    (1.4)    (2.0) 
                                                 
   16-20 Years    17.4    -8.7    8.7    >100    9.6    11.5    21.1    45.4    14.3    20.3    34.6    41.4 
    (3.9)    (4.6)    (6.0)        (2.6)    (4.7)    (5.4)    (12.2)    (1.0)    (1.8)    (2.1)    (2.8) 
                                                 
   More than 20 Years    18.7    -12.0    6.7    >100    11.7    16.0    27.7    42.3    15.5    27.1    42.6    36.3 
    (4.4)    (5.3)    (6.9)        (2.9)    (5.1)    (5.9)    (9.8)    (1.3)    (2.2)    (2.5)    (2.7) 
Note:  These calculations are based on the employment and wage regressions reported in Tables 1 and 2, with standard errors shown in parentheses.  The results in panel A, which do not control for 
education, derive from regression specification (1), and the results in panel B, which do control for education, derive from regression specification (2).  The estimated effects of assimilation on 
immigrant employment probabilities are converted into percentage terms using the employment rates (reported in Table 1) of the most recent immigrant arrival cohort in the 1990/91 data.  Because the 
dependent variables of the wage regressions are in natural logarithms, the estimated coefficients of the “time in destination country” dummies represent the percentage effects of assimilation on 




























Notes:   
Rankings of bargaining centralization and co-ordination are among 19 OECD countries; 1 is highest, ties allowed. 
Australian wage data refer to weekly income of employees. 
Canadian and U.S. wage data refer to weekly earnings of employees. 
UI replacement rate index is an average of replacement rates for two earnings levels, three family situations, and three durations of unemployment, computed by OECD. 
 
Sources: 
Union data from OECD, Employment Outlook, July 1997, Table 2.3. 
Wage data from the 1981 and 1991 Australian and Canadian censuses and the 1980 and 1990 U.S. census.  Sample is restricted to employed, white native-born men aged 25-59. 
 
UI replacement rate index is from OECD Employment Outlook, July1996, Chart 2.2 (numerical rates estimated from graph). 
 
  Australia  Canada  United States 
A. Indicators of Union Power  1980  1990  1980  1990  1980  1990 
  1. Density (%)  48  41  36  36  22  16 
  2. Coverage (%)  88  80  37  38  26  18 
  3. Centralization (ranking)  3  1  17  17  17  17 
  4. Co-ordination 1980  (ranking)  7  5  18  17  18  17 
             
B. Indicators of Wage Dispersion             
  1. 90/10 wage ratio, men  2.67  3.93  3.73  4.21  4.04  4.80 
  2. 90/50 wage ratio, men   1.78  2.00  1.78  1.82  1.89  2.08 
  3. 50/10 wage ratio, men  1.50  1.96  2.10  2.31  2.13  2.31 
  4. Standard deviation of log wages  .499  .596  .684  .797  .775  .797 
             
C. Indicators of Income Support             
  1. UI Benefit Replacement Rate Index (%)  24  26  25  28  13  13 